

1 Steven Craig
2 355 South End Ave, 27L
3 New York, NY 10280

10 CV 5706

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

STEVEN CRAIG

Case # _____

Plaintiff,


vs.

The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation

ORIGINAL PETITION

f/k/a The Bank of New York

Defendant



6

7

Date: _____

8 Comes now Steven Craig, hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner," and moves the court for relief
9 as herein requested:

10 **PARTIES**

11 Petitioner is Steven Craig, 355 South End Ave, 27L New York NY 10280.

12 currently Known Defendant(s) are/is: The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, f/k/a The
13 Bank of New York, located at 1 Wall Street, New York, NY 10286 by and through its attorney.

14 **STATEMENT OF CAUSE**

15 Petitioner, entered into a consumer contract for the refinance of a primary residence located at
16 1327 Prospect Place, Brooklyn, NY 11213 hereinafter referred to as the "property."

17 Defendants, acting in concert and collusion with others, induced Petitioner to enter into a
18 predatory loan agreement with Defendant.

19 Defendants committed numerous acts of fraud against Petitioner in furtherance of a carefully
20 crafted scheme intended to defraud Petitioner.

21 Defendants failed to make proper notices to Petitioner that would have given Petitioner warning
22 of the types of tactics used by Defendants to defraud Petitioner.

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23 Defendants charged false fees to Petitioner at settlement.

24 Defendants used the above referenced false fees to compensate agents of Petitioner in order to
25 induce said agents to breach their fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

26 Defendant's attorney caused to be initiated collection procedures, knowing said collection
27 procedures in the instant action were frivolous as lender is estopped from collection procedures,
28 under authority of Uniform Commercial Code 3-501, subsequent to the request by Petitioner for
29 the production of the original promissory note alleged to create a debt.

30 **IN BRIEF**

31 *(Non-factual Statement of Posture and Position)*

32 It is not the intent of Petitioner to indict the entire industry. It is just that Plaintiff will be
33 making a number of allegations that, outside the context of the current condition of the real
34 estate industry, may seem somewhat outrageous and counter-intuitive.

35 When Petitioner accuses ordinary individuals of acting in concert and collusion with an
36 ongoing criminal conspiracy, it tends to trigger an incredulous response as it is
37 unreasonable to consider that all Agents, loan agents, appraisers, and other ordinary
38 people, just doing what they have been trained to do, are out to swindle the poor
39 unsuspecting borrower.

40 The facts Petitioner is prepared to prove are that Petitioner has been harmed by fraud
41 committed by people acting in concert and collusion, one with the other. Petitioner has no
42 reason to believe that the Agent, loan officer, appraiser, and others were consciously aware
43 that what they were doing was part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy, only that it was,
44 and they, at the very least, kept themselves negligently uninformed of the wrongs they
45 were perpetrating. Petitioner maintains the real culprit is the system itself, including the
46 courts, for failure to strictly enforce the consumer protection laws.

47 **CAREFULLY CRAFTED CRIMINAL CONNIVANCE**

48 *(General State of the Real Estate Industry)*

49 **THE BEST OF INTENTIONS**

50 Prior to the 1980's and 1990's ample government protections were in place to protect
51 consumers and the lending industry from precisely the disaster we now experience.
52 During President Clinton's administration, under the guise of making housing available to
ORIGINAL PETITION

53 the poor, primary protections were relaxed which had the effect of releasing the
54 unscrupulous on the unwary.

55 Prior to deregulation in the 1980's, lenders created loans for which they held and assumed
56 the risk. Consequently, Americans were engaged in safe and stable home mortgages.
57 With the protections removed, the unscrupulous lenders swooped in and, instead of
58 making loans available to the poor, used the opportunity to convince the unsophisticated
59 American public to do something that had been traditionally taboo; home buyers were
60 convinced to speculate with their homes, their most important investment.

61 Bank Of America, NA, Ameriquest, Countrywide, and many others swooped in and
62 convinced Americans to sell their homes, get out of their safe mortgage agreements, and
63 speculate with the equity they had gained by purchasing homes they could not afford.
64 Lenders created loans intended to fail as, under the newly crafted system, the Lender
65 profited more from a mortgage default than from a stable loan.

66 Companies cropped up who called themselves banks when, in fact, they were only either
67 subsidiaries of banks, or unaffiliated companies that were operated for the purpose of
68 creating and selling promissory notes. As will be demonstrated, these companies then
69 profited from the failure of the underlying loans.

70 ***HOW IT WORKS***

71 Briefly, how it works is this, the Lender would secure a large loan from a large bank,
72 convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages and then sell the promise to pay to an
73 investor.

74 People would set up mortgage companies by securing a large loan from one of the major
75 banks and then convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages. In order to accomplish
76 this, an Agent would contract with a seller to find a buyer, bring both seller and buyer to a
77 lender who would secure the title from the seller using the borrowed bank funds for that
78 purpose, and then trade the title to the buyer in exchange for a promissory note.

79 The lender then creates a 20 or 30 year mortgage with money the lender must repay within
80 6 months. As soon as the closing is consummated, the promissory note is sold to an
81 investor pool.

82 Using the instant case as an example, a 456,000.00 note at 8.2450%% interest over 30
83 years will produce \$445,793.11 The lender can then offer to the investor the security

84 instrument (promissory note) at say 50% of it's future value. The investor will, over the
85 life of the note, less approximately 3.00% servicing fees, realize \$618,398.25 . The lender
86 can then pay back the bank and retain a handsome profit in the amount of \$200,649.69.
87 The lender, however, is not done with the deal.

88 The lender signed over the promissory note to the investor at the time of the trade, but did
89 not sign over the lien document (mortgage or deed of trust). The State of Kansas Supreme
90 Court addressed this issue and stated that such a transaction was certainly legal. However,
91 it created a fatal flaw as the holder of the lien document, at time of sale of the security
92 instrument, received consideration in excess of the lien amount. Since the lien holder
93 received consideration, he could not be harmed. Therefore the lien became an
94 unenforceable document.

95 This begs the question: if keeping the lien would render it void, why would the lender not
96 simply transfer the lien with the promissory note? The reason is because the lender will
97 hold the lien for three years, file an Internal Revenue Service Form 1099a, claim the full
98 amount of the lien as abandoned funds, and deduct the full amount from the lender's tax
99 liability. The lender, by this maneuver, gets consideration a second time. And still the
100 lender is not done profiting from the deal.

101 After sale of the promissory note, the lender remains as the servicer for the investor. The
102 lender will receive 3% of each payment the lender collects and renders to the investor
103 pool. However, if the payment is late, the lender is allowed to assess an extra 5% and keep
104 that amount. Also, if the loan defaults, the lender stands to gain thousands for handling the
105 foreclosure.

106 The lender stands to profit more from a note that is overly expensive, than from a good
107 stable loan. And where, you may ask, does all this profit come from? It comes from the
108 equity the borrower had built up in the home. And still the lender is not finished profiting
109 from the deal.

110 Another nail was driven in the American financial coffin when on the last day Congress
111 was in session in 2000 when restrictions that had been in place since the economic
112 collapse of 1907 were removed. Until 1907 investors were allowed to bet on stocks
113 without actually buying them. This unbridled speculation led directly to an economic
114 collapse. As a result the legislature banned the practice, until the year 2000. In 2000 the
115 unscrupulous lenders got their way on the last day of the congressional session. Congress

116 removed the restriction banning derivatives and again allowed the practice, this time
117 taking only 8 years to crash the stock market. This practice allowed the lender to profit
118 further from the loan by betting on the failure of the security instrument he had just sold to
119 the unwary investor, thus furthering the purpose of the lender to profit from both the
120 borrower (consumer) and the investor.

121 The failure of so many loans recently resulted in a seven hundred and fifty billion dollar
122 bailout at the expense of the taxpayer. The unsuspecting consumer was lulled into
123 accepting the pronouncements of the lenders, appraisers, underwriters, and trustees as all
124 were acting under the guise of government regulation and, therefore, the borrower had
125 reason to expect good and fair dealings from all. Unfortunately, the regulations in place to
126 protect the consumer from just this kind of abuse were simply being ignored.

127 The loan origination fee from the HUD1 settlement statement is the finder's fee paid for
128 the referral of the client to the lender by a person acting as an agent for the borrower.
129 Hereinafter, the person or entity who receives any portion of the yield spread premium, or
130 a commission of any kind consequent to securing the loan agreement through from the
131 borrower will be referred to as "Agent." The fee, authorized by the consumer protection
132 law is restricted to 1% of the principal of the note. It was intended that the Agent, when
133 seeking out a lender for the borrower, would seek the best deal for his client rather than
134 who would pay him the most. That was the intent, but not the reality. The reality is that
135 Agents never come away from the table with less than 2% or 3% of the principal. This is
136 accomplished by undisclosed fees to the Agent in order to induce the Agent to breach his
137 fiduciary duty to the borrower and convince the borrower to accept a more expensive loan
138 product than the borrower qualifies for. This will generate more profits for the lender and,
139 consequently, for the Agent.

140 It is a common practice for lenders to coerce appraisers to give a higher appraisal than is
141 the fair market price. This allows the lender to increase the cost of the loan product and
142 give the impression that the borrower is justified in making the purchase.

143 The lender then charges the borrower an underwriting fee in order to convince the
144 borrower that someone with knowledge has gone over the conditions of the note and
145 certified that they meet all legal criteria. The trustee, at closing, participates actively in the
146 deception of the borrower by placing undue stress on the borrower to sign the large stack
147 of paperwork without reading it. The trustee is, after all, to be trusted and has been paid to

148 insure the transaction. This trust is systematically violated for the purpose of taking unfair
149 advantage of the borrower. The entire loan process is a carefully crafted contrive
150 connivance designed and intended to induce the unsophisticated borrower into accepting a
151 loan product that is beyond the borrowers means to repay. With all this, it should be a
152 surprise to no one that this country is having a real estate crisis.

PETITIONER WILL PROVE THE FOLLOWING

153 Petitioner is prepared to prove, by a preponderance of evidence that:

- 155 • Lender has no legal standing to bring collection or foreclosure claims against the
156 property;
- 157 • Lender is not a real party in interest in any contract which can claim a collateral
158 interest in the property;
- 159 • Even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had standing to
160 enforce against Petitioner, no valid lien exists which would give Lender a claim
161 against the property;
- 162 • Even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had standing to
163 enforce against Petitioner, said contract was fraudulent in its creation as
164 endorsement was secured by acts of negligence, common law fraud, fraud by non-
165 disclosure, fraud in the inducement, fraud in the execution, usury, and breaches of
166 contractual and fiduciary obligations by Mortgagee or "Trustee" on the Deed of
167 Trust, "Mortgage Agents," "Loan Originators," "Loan Seller," "Mortgage
168 Aggregator," "Trustee of Pooled Assets," "Trustee or officers of Structured
169 Investment Vehicle," "Investment Banker," "Trustee of Special Purpose
170 Vehicle/Issuer of Certificates of 'Asset-Backed Certificates,'" "Seller of 'Asset-
171 Backed' Certificates (shares or bonds)," "Special Servicer" and Trustee,
172 respectively, of certain mortgage loans pooled together in a trust fund;
- 173 • Defendants have concocted a carefully crafted connivance wherein Lender
174 conspired with Agents, et al, to strip Petitioner of Petitioner's equity in the property
175 by inducing Plaintiff to enter into a predatory loan inflated loan product;
- 176 • Lender received unjust enrichment in the amount of 5% of each payment made late
177 to Lender while Lender and Lender's assigns acted as servicer of the note;

- 178 • Lender and Lender's assigns, who acted as servicer in place of Lender, profited by
179 handling the foreclosure process on a contract Lender designed to have a high
180 probability of default;
- 181 • Lender intended to defraud Investor by converting the promissory note into a
182 security instrument and selling same to Investor;
- 183 • Lender intended to defraud Investor and the taxpayers of the United States by
184 withholding the lien document from the sale of the promissory note in order that
185 Lender could then hold the lien for three years, then prepare and file Internal
186 Revenue Form 1099a and falsely claim the full lien amount as abandoned funds
187 and deduct same from Lender's income tax obligation;
- 188 • Lender defrauded backers of derivatives by betting on the failure of the promissory
189 note the lender designed to default;
- 190 • participant Defendants, et al, in the securitization scheme described herein have
191 devised business plans to reap millions of dollars in profits at the expense of
192 Petitioner and others similarly situated.

PETITIONER SEEKS REMEDY

193 In addition to seeking compensatory, consequential and other damages, Petitioner seeks
194 declaratory relief as to what (if any) party, entity or individual or group thereof is the
195 owner of the promissory note executed at the time of the loan closing, and whether the
196 Deed of Trust (Mortgage) secures any obligation of the Petitioner, and a Mandatory
197 Injunction requiring re-conveyance of the subject property to the Petitioner or, in the
198 alternative a Final Judgment granting Petitioner Quiet Title in the subject property.
199

PETITIONER HAS BEEN HARMED

200 Petitioner has suffered significant harm and detriment as a result of the actions of Defendants.

201 Such harm and detriment includes economic and non-economic damages, and injuries to
202 Petitioner's mental and emotional health and strength, all to be shown according to proof at trial.

203 In addition, Petitioner will suffer grievous and irreparable further harm and detriment unless the
204 equitable relief requested herein is granted.

206

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

207

DEFENDANTS LACK STANDING

208

No evidence of Contractual Obligation

209 Defendants claim a controversy based on a contractual violation by Petitioner but have failed to
210 produce said contract. Even if Defendants produced evidence of the existence of said contract in
211 the form of an allegedly accurate photocopy of said document, a copy is only hearsay evidence
212 that a contract actually existed at one point in time. A copy, considering the present state of
213 technology, could be easily altered. As Lender only created one original and that original was
214 left in the custody of Lender, it was imperative that Lender protect said instrument.

215 In as much as the Lender is required to present the original on demand of Petitioner, there can be
216 no presumption of regularity when the original is not so produced. In as much as Lender has
217 refused Petitioner's request of the chain of custody of the security instrument in question by
218 refusing to identify all current and past real parties in interest, there is no way to follow said
219 chain of custody to insure, by verified testimony, that no alterations to the original provisions in
220 the contract have been made. Therefore, the alleged copy of the original is only hearsay
221 evidence that an original document at one time existed. Petitioner maintains that, absent
222 production of admissible evidence of a contractual obligation on the part of Petitioner,
223 Defendants are without standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

224

No Proper Evidence of Agency

225 Defendants claim agency to represent the principal in a contractual agreement involving
226 Petitioner, however, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence of said agency other than a
227 pronouncement that agency has been assigned by some person, the true identity and capacity of
228 whom has not been established. Defendants can hardly claim to be agents of a principal then
229 refuse to identify said principal. All claims of agency are made from the mouth of the agent with
230 no attempt to provide admissible evidence from the principal.

231 Absent proof of agency, Defendants lack standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the
232 court.

233

Special Purpose Vehicle

234 Since the entity now claiming agency to represent the holder of the security instrument is not the
 235 original lender, Petitioner has reason to believe that the promissory note, upon consummation of
 236 the contract, was converted to a security and sold into a special purpose vehicle and now resides
 237 in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) as defined by the Internal Revenue
 238 Code and as such, cannot be removed from the REMIC as such would be a prohibited
 239 transaction. If the mortgage was part of a special purpose vehicle and was removed on
 240 consideration of foreclosure, the real party in interest would necessarily be the trustee of the
 241 special purpose vehicle. Nothing in the pleadings of Defendants indicates the existence of a
 242 special purpose vehicle, and the lack of a proper chain of custody documentation gives Petitioner
 243 cause to believe defendant is not the proper agent of the real party in interest.

244

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND THEFT

245 Defendants, by and through Defendant's Agents, conspired with other Defendants, et al, toward
 246 a criminal conspiracy to defraud Petitioner. Said conspiracy but are not limited to acts of
 247 negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, and tortuous
 248 acts of conspiracy and theft, to include but not limited to, the assessment of improper fees to
 249 Petitioner by Lender, which were then used to fund the improper payment of commission fees to
 250 Agent in order to induce Agent to violate Agent's fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

251

AGENT PRACTICED UP-SELLING

252 By and through the above alleged conspiracy, Agent practiced up-selling to Petitioner. In so
 253 doing, Agent violated the trust relationship actively cultivated by Agent and supported by fact
 254 that Agent was licensed by the state. Agent further defrauded Petitioner by failing to disclose
 255 Agent's conspiratorial relationship to Lender, Agent violated Agent's fiduciary duty to
 256 Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and honest services, through a series of carefully crafted
 257 connivances, wherein Agent proactively made knowingly false and misleading statements of
 258 alleged fact to Petitioner, and by giving partial disclosure of facts intended to directly mislead
 259 Petitioner for the purpose of inducing Petitioner to make decisions concerning the acceptance of
 260 a loan product offered by the Lender. Said loan product was more expensive than Petitioner
 261 could legally afford. Agent acted with full knowledge that Petitioner would have made a
 262 different decision had Agent given complete disclosure.

263 ***FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT***

264 Lender maliciously induced Petitioner to accept a loan product, Lender knew, or should have
265 known, Petitioner could not afford in order to unjustly enrich Lender.

266 ***EXTRA PROFIT ON SALE OF PREDATORY LOAN PRODUCT***

267 Said more expensive loan product was calculated to produce a higher return when sold as a
268 security to an investor who was already waiting to purchase the loan as soon as it could be
269 consummated.

270 ***Extra Commission for Late Payments***

271 Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce Petitioner to enter into a loan agreement
272 that Lender intended Petitioner would have difficulty paying. The industry standard payment to
273 the servicer for servicing a mortgage note is 3% of the amount collected. However, if the
274 borrower is late on payments, a 5% late fee is added and this fee is retained by the servicer.
275 Thereby, the Lender stands to receive more than double the regular commission on collections if
276 the borrower pays late.

277 ***Extra Income for Handling Foreclosure***

278 Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce petitioner to enter into a loan agreement
279 on which Lender intended petitioner to default. In case of default, the Lender, acting as servicer,
280 receives considerable funds for handling and executing the foreclosure process.

281 ***Credit Default Swap Gambling***

282 Lender, after deliberately creating a loan intended to default is now in a position to bet on credit
283 default swap, commonly referred to as a derivative as addressed more fully below. Since Lender
284 designed the loan to fail, betting on said failure is essentially a sure thing.

285 ***LENDER ATTEMPTING TO FRAUDULENTLY COLLECT ON VOID LIEN***

286 Lender sold the security instrument after closing and received consideration in an amount in
287 excess of the lien held by Lender. Since Lender retained the lien document upon the sale of the
288 security instrument, Lender separated the lien from said security instrument, creating a fatal and
289 irreparable flaw.

290 When Lender received consideration while still holding the lien and said consideration was in
291 excess of the amount of the lien, Lender was in a position such that he could not be harmed and
292 could not gain standing to enforce the lien. The lien was, thereby, rendered void.

293 Since the separation of the lien from the security instrument creates such a considerable concern,
294 said separation certainly begs a question: "Why would the Lender retain the lien when selling the
295 security instrument?"

296 When you follow the money the answer is clear. The Lender will hold the lien for three years,
297 then file an IRS Form 1099a and claim the full amount of the lien as abandoned funds and deduct
298 the full amount from Lender's tax liability, thereby, receiving consideration a second time.

299 Later, in the expected eventuality of default by petitioner, Lender then claimed to transfer the
300 lien to the holder of the security, however, the lien once satisfied, does not gain authority just
301 because the holder, after receiving consideration, decides to transfer it to someone else.

302 ***LENDER PROFIT BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP DERIVATIVES***

303 Lender further stood to profit by credit default swaps in the derivatives market, by way of inside
304 information that Lender had as a result of creating the faulty loans sure to default. Lender was
305 then free to invest on the bet that said loan would default and stood to receive unjust enrichment
306 a third time. This credit default swap derivative market scheme is almost totally responsible for
307 the stock market disaster we now experience as it was responsible for the stock market crash in
308 1907.

309 ***LENDER CHARGED FALSE FEES***

310 Lender charged fees to Petitioner that were in violation of the limitations imposed by the Real
311 Estate Settlement Procedures Act as said fees were simply contrived and not paid to a third party
312 vendor.

313 Lender charged other fees that were a normal part of doing business and should have been
314 included in the finance charge.

315 Below is a listing of the fees charged at settlement. Neither at settlement, nor at any other time
316 did Lender or Trustee provide documentation to show that the fees herein listed were valid,
317 necessary, reasonable, and proper to charge Petitioner.

803	Appraisal	\$196.00
804	Credit Report	\$450.00
805	Lenders Inspection Fee	\$450.00
808	Broker Origination Fee	\$6,840.00
809	Tax Service FEE	\$90.00
810	Flood Check Fee	\$26.00
903	Hazard Insurance	\$1,325.00
1001	Hazard Insurance 1 month 110.42	\$110.42
1003	City Property Taxes 1 month 127.32	\$127.32
1102	Abstract or Title search	\$725.00
1107	Attorney fee	\$865.00
1108	Title Insurance	\$3,012.00
1201	Recording Fee	\$845.00
1202	City/county tax/stamp	\$1,815.00
1203	State tax/stamps	\$11,575.80
1205	ACRIS Filing Fee	\$150.00
1301	Survey End fee	\$212.00

318 Petitioner was unable to determine whether or not the above fees were valid in accordance with
 319 the restrictions provided by the various consumer protection laws. The Petitioner sent a QWR
 320 (qualified written request) via certified mail to the defendant which by law the defendant was
 321 required to respond to. The defendant failed to respond within 20 days that they received the
 322 QWR nor did they attempt to correct any of this issues stated in the QWR within 60 days. This is
 323 in direct violation of RESPA. The defendant did not provide a complete billing from each vendor
 324 who provided the above listed services; the complete contact information for each vendor who
 325 provided a billed service and did not stipulate as to the specific service performed and whether
 326 the said service was necessary. They did not provide a showing that the cost of said service is
 327 reasonable; a showing of why said service is not a regular cost of doing business that should
 328 rightly be included in the finance charge.

329 The above charges are hereby disputed and deemed unreasonable as the defendant did not
 330 demonstrate them to be reasonable, necessary, and in accordance with the limitations and
 331 restrictions included in any and all laws, rules, and regulations intended to protect the consumer.

332 The defendant has failed to properly document the above charges, borrower will consider same
 333 as false charges. The effect of the above amounts that borrower would pay over the life of the
 334 note will be an overpayment of \$373,254.83

335 ***RESPA PENALTY***

336 From a cursory examination of the records, with the few available, the apparent RESPA
 337 violations are as follows: Good Faith Estimate not within limits, No HUD-1 Booklet, Truth In
 338 Lending Statement not within limits compared to Note, Truth in Lending Statement not timely

339 presented, HUD-1 not presented at least one day before closing, No Holder Rule Notice in Note,
340 No 1st Payment Letter.

341 The closing documents included no signed and dated : Financial Privacy Act Disclosure; Equal
342 Credit Reporting Act Disclosure; notice of right to receive appraisal report; servicing disclosure
343 statement; borrower's Certification of Authorization; notice of credit score; RESPA servicing
344 disclosure letter; loan discount fee disclosure; business insurance company arrangement
345 disclosure; notice of right to rescind.

346 The courts have held that the borrower does not have to show harm to claim a violation of the
347 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, as the Act was intended to insure strict compliance. And,
348 in as much as the courts are directed to assess a penalty of no less than two hundred dollars and
349 no more than two thousand, considering the large number enumerated here, it is reasonable to
350 consider that the court will assess the maximum amount for each violation.

351 Since the courts have held that the penalty for a violation of RESPA accrues at consummation of
352 the note, borrower has calculated that, the number of violations found in a cursory examination
353 of the note, if deducted from the principal, would result in an overpayment on the part of the
354 borrower, over the life of the note, of \$382,068.73.

355 If the violation penalty amounts for each of the unsupported fees listed above are included, the
356 amount by which the borrower would be defrauded is \$337,913.95

357 Adding in RESPA penalties for all the unsupported settlement fees along with the TILA>Note
358 variance, it appears that lender intended to defraud borrower in the amount of \$1,093,237.51

359 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH APPRAISER***

360 Lender, in furtherance of the above referenced conspiracy, conspired with appraiser for the
361 purpose of preparing an appraisal with a falsely stated price, in violation of appraiser's fiduciary
362 duty to Petitioner and appraiser's duty to provide fair and honest services, for the purpose of
363 inducing Petitioner to enter into a loan product that was fraudulent toward the interests of
364 Petitioner.

365 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH TRUSTEE***

366 Lender conspired with the trust Agent at closing to create a condition of stress for the specific
367 purpose of inducing Petitioner to sign documents without allowing time for Petitioner to read and
368 fully understand what was being signed.

369 The above referenced closing procedure was a carefully crafted connivance, designed and
370 intended to induce Petitioner, through shame and trickery, in violation of trustee's fiduciary duty
371 to Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and honest services, to sign documents that Petitioner
372 did not have opportunity to read and fully understand, thereby, denying Petitioner full disclosure
373 as required by various consumer protection statutes.

374 ***DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING AND OTHER UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES***

375 In the manner in which Defendants have carried on their business enterprises, they have engaged
376 in a variety of unfair and unlawful business practices prohibited by *15 USC Section 45 et seq.*
377 (Deceptive Practices Act).

378 Such conduct comprises a pattern of business activity within the meaning of such statutes, and
379 has directly and proximately caused Petitioner to suffer economic and non-economic harm and
380 detriment in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

381 ***EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR TILA AND RESPA***

382 The Limitations Period for Petitioners' Damages Claims under TILA and RESPA should be
383 Equitably Tolled due to the DEFENDANTS' Misrepresentations and Failure to Disclose.

384 Any claims for statutory and other money damages under the Truth in Lending Act (*15 U.S.C. §*
385 *1601, et. seq.*) and under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (*12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.*)
386 are subject to a one-year limitations period; however, such claims are subject to the equitable
387 tolling doctrine. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the TILA limitations period in § 1640(e) as
388 subject to equitable tolling. In *King v. California*, *784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1986)*, the court held
389 that given the remedial purpose of TILA, the limitations period should run from the date of
390 consummation of the transaction, but that "the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in appropriate
391 circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or has reasonable
392 opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures that form the basis of the TILA action." *King*
393 *v. California*, *784 F.2d 910, 915 9th Cir. 1986*.

394 Likewise, while the Ninth Circuit has not taken up the question whether *12 U.S.C. § 2614*, the
395 anti-kickback provision of RESPA, is subject to equitable tolling, other Courts have, and hold
396 that such limitations period may be equitably tolled. The Court of Appeals for the District of
397 Columbia held that § 2614 imposes a strictly jurisdictional limitation, *Hardin v. City Title &*

398 *Escrow Co.*, 797 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1986), while the Seventh Circuit came to the
 399 opposite conclusion. *Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp.*, 118 F.3d 1157, 1164 (7th
 400 Cir. 1997). District courts have largely come down on the side of the Seventh Circuit in holding
 401 that the one-year limitations period in § 2614 is subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., *Kerby v.*
 402 *Mortgage Funding Corp.*, 992 F.Supp. 787, 791-98 (D.Md.1998); *Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.*,
 403 700 F.Supp. 1284, 1286-89 (S.D.N.Y.1988). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit, as noted above, has
 404 interpreted the TILA limitations period in 15 U.S.C. § 1640 as subject to equitable tolling; the
 405 language of the two provisions is nearly identical. *King v. California*, 784 F.2d at 914. While not
 406 of precedential value, this Court has previously found both the TILA and RESPA limitations
 407 periods to be subject to equitable tolling. *Blaylock v. First American Title Ins. Co.*, 504
 408 F.Supp.2d 1091, (W.D. Wash. 2007). 1106-07.

409 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the doctrine of equitable tolling "focuses on excusable delay
 410 by the Petitioner," and inquires whether "a reasonable Petitioner would ... have known of the
 411 existence of a possible claim within the limitations period." *Johnson v. Henderson*, 314 F.3d
 412 409, 414 (9th Cir.2002), *Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell*, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.2000).
 413 Equitable tolling focuses on the reasonableness of the Petitioner's delay and does not depend on
 414 any wrongful conduct by the Defendants. *Santa Maria*. at 1178.

415 **BUSINESS PRACTICES CONCERNING DISREGARDING OF UNDERWRITING 416 STANDARDS**

417 Traditionally, Lenders required borrowers seeking mortgage loans to document their income and
 418 assets by, for example, providing W-2 statements, tax returns, bank statements, documents
 419 evidencing title, employment information, and other information and documentation that could
 420 be analyzed and investigated for its truthfulness, accuracy, and to determine the borrower's
 421 ability to repay a particular loan over both the short and long term. Defendants deviated from and
 422 disregarded these standards, particularly with regard to its riskier and more profitable loan
 423 products.

424 **Low-Documentation/No-Documentation Loans.**

425 Driven by its desire for market share and a perceived need to maintain competitiveness with the
 426 likes of Countrywide, Defendants began to introduce an ever increasing variety of low and no
 427 documentation loan products, including the HARMs and HELOCs described hereinabove, and
 428 began to deviate from and ease its underwriting criteria, and then to grant liberal exceptions to
 ORIGINAL PETITION

429 the already eased underwriting standards to the point of disregarding such standards. This
430 quickened the loan origination process, allowing for the generation of more and more loans
431 which could then be resold and/or securitized in the secondary market.

432 Defendants marketed no-documentation/low-documentation loan programs that included
433 HARMs and HELOCs, among others, in which loans were given based on the borrower's "stated
434 income" or "stated assets" (SISA) neither of which were verified. Employment was verbally
435 confirmed, if at all, but not further investigated, and income, if it was even considered as a factor,
436 was to be roughly consistent with incomes in the types of jobs in which the borrower was
437 employed. When borrowers were requested to document their income, they were able to do so
438 through information that was less reliable than in a full-documentation loan.

439 For stated income loans, it became standard practice for loan processors, loan officers and
440 underwriters to rely on www.salary.com to see if a stated income was reasonable. Such stated
441 income loans, emphasizing loan origination from a profitability standpoint at the expense of
442 determining the ability of the borrower to repay the loan from an underwriting standpoint,
443 encouraged the overstating and/or fabrication of income.

444 **Easing of Underwriting Standards**

445 In order to produce more loans that could be resold in the secondary mortgage market,
446 Defendants also relaxed, and often disregarded, traditional underwriting standards used to
447 separate acceptable from unacceptable risk. Examples of such relaxed standards were reducing
448 the base FICO score needed for a SISA loan.

449 Other underwriting standards that Defendants relaxed included qualifying interest rates (the rate
450 used to determine whether borrowers can afford the loan), loan to value ratios (the amount of
451 loan(s) compared to the appraised/sale price of the property, whichever is lower), and debt-to-
452 income ratios (the amount of monthly income compared to monthly debt service payments and
453 other monthly payment obligations).

454 With respect to HARMs, Defendants underwrote loans without regard to the borrower's long-
455 term financial circumstances, approving the loan based on the initial fixed rate without taking
456 into account whether the borrower could afford the substantially higher payment that would
457 inevitably be required during the remaining term of the loan.

458 With respect to HELOCs, Defendants underwrote and approved such loans based only on the
 459 borrower's ability to afford the interest-only payment during the initial draw period of the loan,
 460 rather than on the borrower's ability to afford the subsequent, fully amortized principal and
 461 interest payments.

462 As Defendants pushed to expand market share, they eased other basic underwriting standards.
 463 For example, higher loan-to-value (LTV) and combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios were
 464 allowed. Likewise, higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratios were allowed. At the same time that they
eased underwriting standards the Defendants also were encouraging consumers to go further into
debt in order to supply the very lucrative aftermarket of mortgage backed securities. The relaxed
underwriting standards created the aftermarket supply they needed. As a result, the Defendants
made it easy for the unwary consumer to take on more debt than he could afford by encouraging
unsound financial practices, all the while knowing defaults would occur more and more
frequently as the credit ratios of citizens reached the limit of the new relaxed underwriting
 467 standards.

472 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, from its own
 473 underwriting guidelines industry standards that it was accumulating and selling/reselling risky
 474 loans that were likely to end up in default. However, as the pressure mounted to increase market
 475 share and originate more loans, Defendants began to grant "exceptions" even to its relaxed
 476 underwriting guidelines. Such was the environment that loan officers and underwriters were,
 477 from time to time, placed in the position of having to justify why they did not approve a loan that
 478 failed to meet underwriting criteria.

479 **Risk Layering**

480 Defendants compromised its underwriting even further by risk layering, i.e. combining high risk
 481 loans with one or more relaxed underwriting standards.

482 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that layered risk
 483 would increase the likelihood of default. Among the risk layering Defendants engaged in were
 484 approving HARM loans with little to no down payment, little to no documentation, and high
 485 DTI/LTV/CLTV ratios. Despite such knowledge, Defendants combined these very risk factors in
 486 the loans it promoted to borrowers.

487 Loan officers and mortgage Agents aided and abetted this scheme by working closely with other
488 mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers to increase loan originations, knowing or having reason to
489 believe that Defendants and other mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers with whom they did
490 business ignored basic established underwriting standards and acted to mislead the borrower, all
491 to the detriment of the borrower and the consumer of loan products..

492 Petitioner is informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them,
493 engaged and/or actively participated in, authorized, ratified, or had knowledge of, all of the
494 business practices described above in paragraphs 30-42 of this Complaint

495 ***UNJUST ENRICHMENT***

496 Petitioner is informed and believes that each and all of the Defendants received a benefit at
497 Petitioner's expense, including but not limited to the following: To the Agent, commissions,
498 yield spread premiums, spurious fees and charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to
499 be proved at trial; To the originating Lender, commissions, incentive bonuses, resale premiums,
500 surcharges and other "back end" payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To the investors,
501 resale premiums, and high rates of return; To the servicers including EMS, servicing fees,
502 percentages of payment proceeds, charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to be
503 proved at trial; To all participants, the expectation of future revenues from charges, penalties and
504 fees paid by Petitioner when the unaffordable LOAN was foreclosed or refinanced.

505 By their misrepresentations, omissions and other wrongful acts alleged heretofore, Defendants,
506 and each of them, were unjustly enriched at the expense of Petitioner, and Petitioner was unjustly
507 deprived, and is entitled to restitution in the amount of \$1,093,237.51

508 ***CLAIM TO QUIET TITLE.***

509 Petitioner properly averred a claim to quiet title. Petitioner included both the street address, and
510 the Assessor's Parcel Number for the property. Petitioner has set forth facts concerning the title
511 interests of the subject property. Moreover, as shown above, Petitioner's claims for rescission
512 and fraud are meritorious. As such, Petitioner's bases for quiet title are meritorious as well.

513 Defendants have no title, estate, lien, or interest in the Subject Property in that the purported
514 power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust is of no force or effect because Defendants' security
515 interest in the Subject Property has been rendered void and that the Defendants are not the holder

516 in due course of the Promissory Note. Moreover, because Petitioner properly pled all Defendants'
517 involvement in a fraudulent scheme, all Defendants are liable for the acts of its co-conspirators,

518 "a Petitioner is entitled to damages from those Defendants who concur in the tortious
519 scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose." *Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.*, 24 Cal.
520 3d 773, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45 (1979); *Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc.*
521 v. *Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.*, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d
522 27 (1st Dist. 2006); *Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp.*, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1571, 47 Cal.
523 Rptr. 2d 752 (2d Dist. 1995).

524 **SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING**

525 Petitioner has sufficiently pled that relief can be granted on each and every one of the
526 Complaint's causes of action. A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond
527 doubt that the Petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of Petitioner claim which would
528 entitle Petitioner to relief." *Housley v. U.S.* (9th Cir. Nev. 1994) 35 F.3d 400, 401. "All
529 allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most
530 favorable to Petitioner." *Argabright v. United States*, 35 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).

531 Attendant, the Complaint includes a "short, plain statement, of the basis for relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
532 8(a). The Complaint contains cognizable legal theories, sufficient facts to support cognizable legal
533 theories, and seeks remedies to which Petitioner is entitled. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d
534 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the legal
535 conclusions in the Complaint can and should be drawn from the facts alleged, and, in turn, the court
536 should accept them as such. *Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network*, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir, 1994). Lastly,
537 Petitioner's complaint contains claims and has a probable validity of proving a "set of facts" in support of
538 their claim entitling them to relief. *Housley v. U.S.* (9th Cir. Nev. 1994) 35 F.3d 400, 401. Therefore,
539 relief as requested herein should be granted.

540 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

541 **BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY**

542 Defendants Agent, appraiser, trustee, Lender, et al, and each of them, owed Petitioner a fiduciary
543 duty of care with respect to the mortgage loan transactions and related title activities involving
544 the Trust Property.

545 Defendants breached their duties to Petitioner by, *inter alia*, the conduct described above. Such
546 breaches included, but were not limited to, ensuring their own and Petitioners' compliance with
547 all applicable laws governing the loan transactions in which they were involved, including but
548 not limited to, TILA, HOEPA, RESPA and the Regulations X and Z promulgated there under.

549 Defendant's breaches of said duties were a direct and proximate cause of economic and non-
550 economic harm and detriment to Petitioner(s).

551 Petitioner did suffer economic, non-economic harm, and detriment as a result of such conduct,
552 all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

553 ***CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE/NEGLIGENCE PER SE***

554 Defendants owed a general duty of care with respect to Petitioners, particularly concerning their
555 duty to properly perform due diligence as to the loans and related transactional issues described
556 hereinabove.

557 In addition, Defendants owed a duty of care under TILA, HOEPA, RESPA and the Regulations
558 X and Z promulgated there under to, among other things, provide proper disclosures concerning
559 the terms and conditions of the loans they marketed, to refrain from marketing loans they knew
560 or should have known that borrowers could not afford or maintain, and to avoid paying undue
561 compensation such as "yield spread premiums" to mortgage Agents and loan officers.

562 Defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the loan
563 transactions involving Petitioner and other persons similarly situated were defective, unlawful,
564 violating of federal and state laws and regulations, and would subject Petitioner to economic and
565 non-economic harm and other detriment.

566 Petitioner is among the class of persons that TILA, HOEPA, RESPA and the Regulations X and
567 Z promulgated there under were intended and designed to protect, and the conduct alleged
568 against Defendants is the type of conduct and harm which the referenced statutes and regulations
569 were designed to deter.

570 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Petitioner suffered economic and
571 non-economic harm in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.

572 **AGENT: COMMON LAW FRAUD**

573 If any Agents' misrepresentations made herein were not intentional, said misrepresentations were
574 negligent. When the Agents made the representations alleged herein, he/she/it had no reasonable
575 ground for believing them to be true.

576 Agents made these representations with the intention of inducing Petitioner to act in reliance on
577 these representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the expectation that Petitioner
578 would so act.

579 Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent et al, facilitated, aided and abetted various Agents
580 in their negligent misrepresentation, and that various Agents were negligent in not implementing
581 procedures such as underwriting standards oversight that would have prevented various Agents
582 from facilitating the irresponsible and wrongful misrepresentations of various Agents to
583 Defendants.

584 Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent acted in concert and collusion with others named
585 herein in promulgating false representations to cause Petitioner to enter into the LOAN without
586 knowledge or understanding of the terms thereof.

587 As a proximate result of the negligent misrepresentations of Agents as herein alleged, the
588 Petitioner sustained damages, including monetary loss, emotional distress, loss of credit, loss of
589 opportunities, attorney fees and costs, and other damages to be determined at trial. As a
590 proximate result of Agents' breach of duty and all other actions as alleged herein, Defendant has
591 suffered severe emotional distress, mental anguish, harm, humiliation, embarrassment, and
592 mental and physical pain and anguish, all to Petitioner's damage in an amount to be established
593 at trial.

594 **PETITIONER PROPERLY AVERRED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
595 COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.**

596 Petitioner properly pled Defendants violated the breach of implied covenant of good faith and
597 fair dealing. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
598 performance and its enforcement." *Price v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 478, 261
599 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Rest.2d Contracts § 205. A mortgage Agent has fiduciary duties. *Wyatt v.*

600 Union Mortgage Co., (1979) 24 Cal. 3d. 773. Further, In *Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v*
 601 *Jones*, (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 917, the court stated:

602 In the area of insurance contracts the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has taken on a
 603 particular significance, in part because of the special relationship between the insurer and the
 604 insured. The insurer, when determining whether to settle a claim, must give at least as much
 605 consideration to the welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests. . . The standard is
 606 premised on the insurer's obligation to protect the insured's interests . . . *Id.* at 937.

607 Likewise, there is a special relationship between an Agent and borrower. "A person who
 608 provides Agency services to a borrower in a covered loan transaction by soliciting Lenders or
 609 otherwise negotiating a consumer loan secured by real property, is the fiduciary of the
 610 consumer...this fiduciary duty [is owed] to the consumer regardless of whom else the Agent may
 611 be acting as an Agent for . . . The fiduciary duty of the Agent is to deal with the consumer in
 612 *good faith*. If the *Agent knew or should have known that the Borrower will or has a likelihood of*
 613 *defaulting ... they have a fiduciary duty to the borrower not to place them in that loan.*"
 614 (California Department of Real Estate, *Section 8: Fiduciary Responsibility*, www.dre.ca.gov).
 615 [*Emphasis Added*].

616 All Defendants, willfully breached their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
 617 Petitioner when Defendants: (1) Failed to provide all of the proper disclosures; (2) Failed to
 618 provide accurate Right to Cancel Notices; (3) Placed Petitioner into Petitioner's current loan
 619 product without regard for other more affordable products; (4) Placed Petitioner into a loan
 620 without following proper underwriting standards; (5) Failed to disclose to Petitioner that
 621 Petitioner was going to default because of the loan being unaffordable; (6) Failed to perform
 622 valid and /or properly documented substitutions and assignments so that Petitioner could
 623 ascertain Petitioner rights and duties; and (7) Failed to respond in good faith to Petitioner's
 624 request for documentation of the servicing of Petitioner's loan and the existence and content of
 625 relevant documents. Additionally, Defendants breached their implied covenant of good faith and
 626 fair dealing with Petitioner when Defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings even without the
 627 right under an alleged power of sale because the purported assignment was not recorded and by
 628 willfully and knowingly financially profiting from their malfeasance. Therefore, due to the
 629 special relationship inherent in a real estate transaction between Agent and borrower, *and* all
 630 Defendants' participation in the conspiracy, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

631 ***CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 15 U.S.C. §1601 ET
632 SEQ***

633 Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference, re-pleads and re-alleges each and every allegation
634 contained in all of the paragraphs of the General Allegations and Facts Common to All Causes of
635 Action as though the same were set forth herein.

636 Petitioner is informed and believes that Defendant's violation of the provisions of law rendered
637 the credit transaction null and void, invalidates Defendant's claimed interest in the Subject
638 Property, and entitles Petitioner to damages as proven at trial.

639 ***INTENTIONAL INFILCTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS***

640 The conduct committed by Defendants, driven as it was by profit at the expense of increasingly
641 highly leveraged and vulnerable consumers who placed their faith and trust in the superior
642 knowledge and position of Defendants, was extreme and outrageous and not to be tolerated by
643 civilized society.

644 Defendants either knew that their conduct would cause Petitioner to suffer severe emotional
645 distress, or acted in conscious and/or reckless disregard of the probability that such distress
646 would occur.

647 Petitioner did in fact suffer severe emotional distress as an actual and proximate result of the
648 conduct of Defendants as described hereinabove.

649 As a result of such severe emotional distress, Petitioner suffered economic and non economic
650 harm and detriment, all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

651 Petitioner demands that Defendants provide Petitioner with release of lien on the lien signed by
652 Petitioner and secure to Petitioner quite title;

653 Petitioner demands Defendants disgorge themselves of all enrichment received from Petitioner
654 as payments to Defendants based on the fraudulently secured promissory note in an amount to be
655 calculated by Defendants and verified to Petitioner;

656 Petitioner further demands that Defendants pay to Petitioner an amount equal to treble the
657 amount Defendants intended to defraud Petitioner of which amount Petitioner calculated to be
658 equal to \$3,279,712.53

PRAYER

660 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for judgment against the named Defendants, and each of them,
661 as follows:

662 For an emergency restraining order enjoining lender and any successor in interest from
663 foreclosing and selling the Petitioner's Property pending adjudication of Petitioner's
664 claims set forth herein;

665 For a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from engaging in the fraudulent,
666 deceptive, predatory and negligent acts and practices alleged herein;

667 For quiet title to Property;

668 For rescission of the loan contract and restitution by Defendants to Petitioner according
669 to proof at trial;

670 For disgorgement of all amounts wrongfully acquired by Defendants according to proof
671 at trial;

For actual monetary damages in the amount \$1,093,237.51;

673 For pain and suffering due to extreme mental anguish in an amount to be determined at
674 trial.

675 For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest according to proof at trial;

676 For punitive damages according to proof at trial in an amount equal to \$3,279,712.53.

677 For attorney's fees and costs as provided by statute; and,

678 For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

679 Respectfully Submitted

679 Respectfully Submitted,

680

681

682 Steven Craig